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Technical Note: Elimination of
Retroactive Settlement in the ACSS
Eric Tuer, Financial Markets Department
n response to a request from the Canadian Pay-
ments Association (CPA), on 1 November 2003
the Bank of Canada abandoned its practice of
backdating the results of the settlement of pay-
ments through the Automated Clearing Settlement
System (ACSS). The adoption of “next-day settlement”
means that the results of the settlement process will
appear on the central Bank’s books on the day items
actually settle in the ACSS rather than on the previous
business day. Since July 1986, settlement of these items
had occurred at noon the day after items were pre-
sented in the clearing process, but the results of the
settlement process were recognized on the Bank’s books
the previous day, through backdating or “retroactive”
settlement (Dingle 1986).
The Bank of Canada has advocated this change for
some time. Changing the settlement to the next day
was first discussed before the introduction of the
Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) (Bank of Canada
1995). The Bank saw it as a means to simplify the pay-
ment process and to improve the reporting of settle-
ment risk, and at the same time to promote the cost-
effectiveness of the payment systems. Direct clearers
were initially reluctant to accept the change, mindful
of reintroducing ﬂoat issues for their customer base,
as well as the associated costs and inefﬁciencies of
monitoring account activity. 1 This concern, however,
1.   A direct clearer is a deposit-taking institution that has an ACSS settlement
account at the Bank of Canada. For a complete description of the organization
and workings of the ACSS, see the Bank of Canada Web site at http://
www.bankofcanada.ca/en/payments/systems.html#automated. “Float”
consists of cheques and other items relating to deposits that have not been
cleared.
I
has been addressed, as the ACSS participants agreed to
an interest-compensation mechanism among them-
selves. As a result of the shift to next-day settlement
with interest compensation, the most signiﬁcant costs
associated with the settlement of payments through
the ACSS will be eliminated.
Costs of Retroactive Settlement in an
LVTS Environment
The LVTS was introduced in 1999 to electronically
process large-value and time-sensitive items on a
“real-time” basis (Dingle 1998). It provides ﬁnality
of payment based on the well-developed risk controls
in the system.2 By comparison, the ACSS is the system
through which other payment items, such as cheques,
are cleared and settled. This system settles at noon the
day after items are presented for clearing. While the
LVTS is deemed to be systemically important, the
ACSSis not.3 Since the ACSS does not provide intraday
ﬁnality to fund transfers, items exchanged via the
ACSSare at risk until settlement occurs, hours after the
clearing process begins.
When the LVTS was ﬁrst introduced, the interest rate
band in the ACSS was initially set so that direct clearers
would incur the same level of costs as under the previ-
ous averaging period regime. Since the interest rate
2.   These arrangements meet the standards for systemically important pay-
ment systems, which are required to have a built-in mechanism to protect
participants against settlement risk (Goodlet 1997).
3.   After a review in December 2002, the ACSS was declared not to be desig-
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band for the LVTS was narrower, an overdraft or long
position was less costly in this system compared with
the ACSS. This encouraged the migration of large-
value items to the LVTS from the ACSS. End-of-day
positive or negative balances in the LVTS are subject to
a 25-basis-point cost relative to the target overnight
rate, while end-of-day net gains or losses in the ACSS
were initially subject to a 250-basis-point cost. Over
time, as certain migration milestones were met, the
ACSS interest rate band was reduced, and before the
introduction of next-day settlement, the cost stood
at 150 basis points. Daily volumes in the ACSS, which
were around $40 billion immediately after the intro-
duction of the LVTS, are down to $16 billion today, in
part because of the effect of the cost incentive on
migration levels.
One of the speciﬁc ways in which ACSS participants
encountered this cost under the backdated settlement
arrangements was related to a payment transaction that
involved both the LVTS and the ACSS. For example, a
direct clearer could receive a cheque payable to the
Government of Canada for clearing and settlement in
the ACSS, but would be required to make that pay-
ment in the LVTS. In this simpliﬁed case, the direct
clearer would end the day paying the target rate plus
25 basis points on its overdraft in the LVTS and would
earn the target rate less 150 basis points on its positive
ACSS balance. If these balances had been held in the
LVTS, the direct clearer would have received signiﬁ-
cantly more in interest. This opportunity cost was
known as a “dislocation” cost. 4
The Impact of Next-Day Settlement
on Costs
The introduction of next-day settlement eliminates
many of the costs for the ﬁnancial institutions that
participate in the ACSS, although it will result in a
small capital charge being imposed. To understand
how the introduction of the new regime eliminated
4. In fact, direct clearers actively attempt to reduce dislocation costs through
interbank transactions and the late-day execution of Settlement Exchange
Transactions (SETs), in which a direct clearer “swaps” LVTS funds for ACSS
funds with one or more counterparties. In the above example, the direct
clearer would search out other direct clearers who hold positive LVTS balances
and are projected to have negative balances in the ACSS, although they will
not know their ACSS positions with certainty until the next morning. If the
other counterparty(ies) agreed, the direct clearer would “receive” an LVTS
payment of a speciﬁed amount from them (in the best-case scenario taking
the LVTS balance to zero) and would allow its ACSS balances to be debited by
the same amount as the amount received.
most of the costs, a brief review of ACSS procedures
under the old system will be helpful.
Over the course of a business day, direct clearers receive
on deposit numerous paper items and instruments
from various electronic payment streams. These
deposits are normally credited to the clients’ accounts
on the same day. The items are sorted, processed, and
cleared that evening in the ACSS. The calculation by
the ACSSof the net amount of claims, or obligations, of
the participating ﬁnancial institutions is made in most
regions at 9:30 the next morning (EST), with adjustments
allowed up to 11 a.m. Previously, the Bank of Canada
determined from the ACSS the aggregate amounts due
to and from direct clearers, and settlement took place
at noon through credits and debits in the direct clearer’s
ACSS settlement accounts at the Bank. By allowing the
books of the Bank to remain open into the following
business day, until the clearing process was completed
and settlement occurred, the effective date for the set-
tlement was the same day that most payment items
were credited to the customers’ accounts.
With next-day settlement, the direct clearer sees its
ﬁnal ACSS multilateral net clearing position by mid-
to late morning the day after the items are entered into
the clearing process. The net gains and losses arising
from the ACSS clearing process appear on the direct
clearers’ balance sheets as a component of “items in
transit” rather than as positive balances in the ACSS
held as deposits or as central Bank advances on the
Bank of Canada’s balance sheet.5 The items settle, and
the direct clearers’ positions with the Bank of Canada
will be changed on the business day after the payment
items are credited to the customers’ accounts.
The interest-compensation mechanism agreed to by
the ACSS members allows direct clearers to give value
to the customer’s funds on the day the item is depos-
ited and avoids the imposition of a ﬂoat charge on
their customer base. The CPA determines the interest
compensation due to or from each direct clearer. (This
is the only new infrastructure required for the imple-
mentation of this project.) Direct clearers with a net
5.     Bank of Canada advances are secured loans made to a bank or other
member of the CPA. As a result of the changes described above, the balance
sheet of the Bank of Canada will contract. In 2002, the average size of the
positive and negative balances held at the Bank by CPA members active in
the ACSS was approximately $500 million. Given the 300-basis-point band in
this payment system, this represents annual cost savings to the industry of
$15 million at the expense of Bank of Canada proﬁts, which are ultimately
remitted to the Government of Canada.41 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2003
credit position in the ACSSreceive an interest payment
to cover their cost of giving credit to depositors on the
business day before receiving funds in settlement.
Conversely, direct clearers with net debit positions
make payments to offset their net beneﬁt of debiting
their customers’ accounts on the business day before
paying funds in settlement. Interest compensation is
calculated daily by the CPA at the target overnight rate
(i.e., the Bank Rate less 25 basis points) and is
included in the clearing balances settled at the Bank of
Canada, using LVTS funds.
An institution that ﬁnds itself with a negative clearing
balance does not take an ACSS advance (an overdraft
loan), but makes an LVTS payment to its ACSS sub-
account at the Bank of Canada. When all payments
have been credited to the subaccounts of the direct
clearers with negative clearing balances, the Bank
debits these accounts and credits the accounts of
direct clearers that are to receive funds to settle their
settlement account. There are no ACSS balances or
overdrafts carried on the Bank of Canada’s balance
sheet overnight, reducing the cost to participants.
In the unlikely event that a direct clearer does not pay
the amount of its negative clearing balance through
the LVTS, it may still apply for an ACSS advance from
the Bank to obtain the liquidity needed to settle its
position. This may be required where the LVTS system
is unavailable, or where a direct clearer is unable to
connect to the system. It is unlikely that this facility will
be used for borrowing overnight, as negative balances
will be settled by an LVTS payment at some point dur-
ing the remainder of the day. Following its practice
with the continuous linked settlement (CLS) system
for settling foreign exchange transactions, the Bank
of Canada will not impose a charge based on interest
rates on these overdrafts that are repaid later the same
day. In the future, a levy or a fee for this service could
be introduced.
It is important to note that the new settlement arrange-
ments for the ACSS do not alter the settlement risk
borne by ACSS participants. By including in the ﬁnan-
cial statements, in the items in transit category, the
“settlement” risk that each ACSS participant bears, the
ownership and extent of this exposure is clariﬁed.
Including ACSS net claims under items in transit on
the balance sheet will increase the capital charge
incurred by ACSS participants following the applica-
tion of a risk weighting to the additional amount of
net receivables as a result of the ACSS clearings.6
Impact on ACSS Stakeholders
ACSS participants
The recent move to next-day settlement accounting
and the subsequent change to the cost structure of the
ACSS payment system will have an impact on indus-
try behaviour. Risk mitigation rather than cost is likely
to be the main driver for future migration of payments
from the ACSS to the LVTS. As well, a number of
migration initiatives and projects have recently been
completed or are currently underway to move more
payment value from the ACSS to the LVTS. Among
them are the inclusion of equity trading in the CDSX7
and increased settlement of entitlements in the LVTS.
In addition, to promote the settlement of large-value
payments in the LVTS, a cap of $25 million has been
set for paper items eligible for the ACSS. To prevent
slippage of large payment items back to the ACSS, the
Bank of Canada will continue to monitor the values
processed in both payment systems.
The desire to minimize capital costs associated with
items in transit means that direct clearers will con-
tinue to use Settlement Exchange Transactions (SETS).
Direct clearers will attempt to reduce the items in tran-
sit on their balance sheet by limiting, when possible,
their pending position in the ACSS.   As the migration
of payment items and payment streams to the LVTS
continues, the dollar amount of SETS will diminish.
The change in the cost structure of the payment sys-
tem has other potential effects. Pricing of large depos-
its and overdrafts, particularly those transacted late in
the business day, may be reviewed. Before next-day
settlement was introduced, if a direct clearer held pos-
itive or negative balances at the end of the day in the
6. As an example, if a bank had “net receivables” of $100 million in the ACSS,
this would be posted as a $100 million asset captured in items in transit on its
balance sheet. The Ofﬁce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions states
that “cheques and other items in transit” attract a risk weighting of 20 per cent,
creating a risk-adjusted asset of $20 million. Bank for International Settlement
guidelines set out that this must be supported by at least 8 per cent in capital.
As a result, $1.6 million in capital is set aside. The actual capital charge depends
on what the direct clearer targets for a return on capital. If 12 per cent is
targeted, then thecapital charge amountsto $192,000, or approximately20 basis
points. This compares to the 300-basis-point ACSS band that is being eliminated.
7. CDSX is the new clearing and settlement system for debt and equity securities
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ACSS as a result of an unexpected late-day customer
transaction, the direct clearer would receive the lower
limit of the ACSS interest rate band or be required to
pay the upper limit. Now the direct clearer will
receive or pay the target overnight rate. The competitive
forces of the industry will ultimately determine the
level of beneﬁt passed on to the customer base.
Bank of Canada
The movement to next-day settlement with interest
compensation has no impact on the implementation
of monetary policy by the Bank of Canada, which
currently involves adjusting, on a day-to-day basis,
the level of Receiver General deposits held at the Bank
versus those held by participants in the LVTS. As
already noted, however, the move has reduced the size
of the Bank’s balance sheet, resulting in an estimated
annual loss of revenue of some $15 million for the fed-
eral government.
The elimination of positions in the ACSS of members
of the Canadian Payments Association with the Bank
of Canada will result in changes to the table that
currently reports these data in two Bank publications:
the Weekly Financial Statistics and the Bank of Canada
Banking and Financial Statistics.
Conclusion
The change to next-day settlement with interest com-
pensation has eliminated many of the costs associated
with being a participant in the ACSS. It has done so
without affecting the implementation of monetary
policy and without reintroducing ﬂoat charges for
customers of ﬁnancial institutions, and it has avoided
major programming changes at the ﬁnancial institu-
tions. As well, the bookkeeping conforms to Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and is con-
sistent with international best practices for settlement
of non-real-time payment systems. Finally, and impor-
tantly, the change to next-day settlement properly
accounts for settlement risk taken by ACSS partici-
pants by posting this exposure on the balance sheets
of those who bear it.
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